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The Skill of Speaking
Willem J.M. Levelt
Max-Planck-lnstitut für Psycholinguistik, Nijmegen, Netherlands
After an introductory note on the general neglect that this universal, species- 
specific and existential skill has met in the history of psychology, an outline is 
sketched of its internal organisation. Various relatively autonomous processing 
components interact to map a speaker’s communicative intention into a fluent 
sequence of articulatory gestures. The chapter then proceeds to discuss each 
component’s functioning in some detail on the hand of ongoing empirical, 
especially experimental, research in the Max-Planck-lnstitut fur Psycholinguistik. 
The first component process discussed is the conceptual preparation of speech, the 
retrieval of communicately relevant information, its linearisation and its 
propositional encoding. The second component process is grammatical encoding, 
the retrieval of appropriate words for the concepts to be expressed, and the creation 
of a syntactic plan. The next component deals with phonological encoding, i.e. the 
retrieval of phonological information for each word, and the computation of a 
phonetic plan for each word and the utterance as a whole. This plan is executed by 
the articulatory component, with overt speech as output. Finally, this output is fed 
back through the speaker’s speech comprehenesion system, where it is monitored 
for problems of delivery. In case of necessity, the speaker will initiate a self-repair.
It is shown that self-repairing is a highly systematic process.
INTRODUCTION
The theory of how we speak has traditionally been a stepchild of psychology. 
Although most people spend substantial parts of the day talking, the topic of 
speaking has been systematically evaded in just about all traditional textbooks 
of psychology. And this goes back to the beginnings of scientific psychology. 
Of the 26 chapters in William James’ Textbook of  Psychology (1892), for
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instance, not a single one deals with language or speech. In his The Principles 
of Psychology (1890) he squibs at language as something utterly un- 
psychological: “Language”, he writes, “was originally made by men that were 
not psychologists”. And the American tradition in psychology followed suit. In 
Europe, the Gestalt psychologists gave positive lip-service to the importance of 
speech, but factually ignored it completely. There were also, however, some 
towering exceptions. Both Wilhelm Wundt (1900) and Karl Biihler (1934) placed 
language and speech quite central in their theories of psychology, although they 
disagreed between them on about every detail. But even this tradition definitely 
died with Biihler’s flight from the Nazi’s in 1938. Otherwise, the study of 
language and speech was left to linguists, phoneticians and neurologists.
All this is very surprising because there can be no doubt that speaking is our 
most complex, and our most species-specific, cognitive-motor skill. 
Psychologists are masters in studying the trivial, and in ignoring that which makes 
us biologically human. But the tide has been turning recently, and the study of 
how we speak is becoming fashionable again among psychologists. In the 
following, I will report on some work from my own laboratory— the Max- 
Planck-lnstitut fur Psycholinguistik— but much of it is based on insights we owe 
to a small number of pioneers and friends who had the guts to take pity on the 
stepchild, to feed and to fondle it.
GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE SKILL
As any skill, speaking involves the interaction of several processing components. 
Even pre-theoretically, it is obvious that speaking at least comprises a level of 
intentions and ideas, a level of words and sentences, and a level of sound 
production or articulation. These three levels of processing have their own 
characteristic speeds of operation. In normal fluent speech, new elementary 
ideas (roughly corresponding to the occurrence of main verbs) come at the 
(average) speed of about one every 4-5  sec. The generation of ideas to be 
expressed in speech is a relatively slow strategic process. Individual words are 
produced at a rate of about two or three per second. This is already quite fast; 
retrieving words is a largely automatic process. Individual speech sounds, finally, 
are produced at machine gun rate, some 10-15 per second. The process is fully 
automatic; there is no way for the speaker to ponder about choosing an /a/ or an 
/o/, a fk/ or a /p/.
Figure 5.1 is a blueprint or working model of the main processing components 
that cooperate in the production of fluent speech. The slow strategic component 
is labelled conceptualise)'. Speaking is a form of goal-directed behaviour. The 
speaker conceives of some communicative intention, for instance to inform the 
interlocutor about something, to commit the interlocutor to some course of action 
(as in requesting), to share irritation or elation about something, etc. In all these 
cases, the speaker must select information whose expression will reveal the
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speaker’s intention to the partner in conversation. This information is technically 
called the speaker’s “message”. Which message will do the job depends on 
myriad circumstances, on what was said before in the ongoing conversation, on 
what the partners in speech share in terms of beliefs and expectations, on their 
shared perceptions, on their status relation, and so on.
But whatever the message is going to be, it has to be cast in linguistic form. 
This is the task of the formulator. In fact, it performs two quite distinct operations, 
the first of which is grammatical encoding. It consists of selecting the appropriate 
words from the lexicon and putting them in some appropriate syntactic order. 
This developing syntactic structure is called a “surface structure”. The second 
one is to generate an articulatory or phonetic shape for all words and for the 
utterance as a whole. This is called phonological encoding. The final result is 
an articulatory plan in which the speech sounds to be articulated and the prosody 
of the utterance are fully specified. Phenomenologically, this phonetic plan 
presents itself to us as “internal speech”.
This articulatory plan, finally, can be executed by our articulatory system. This 
is really our apparatus for breathing and for the ingestion of food. It is one of
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the most astonishing feats of evolution that it also developed into our most 
complex and species-specific motor system, the carrier of language. In speaking, 
more than a 100 different muscles are coordinated to create the highly 
overlapping articulatory gestures that produce intelligible speech.
Though we have now gone from intentions to overt speech, we have not yet 
put the whole system on the map. Speakers are their own hearers. Just as we can 
listen to others and detect their intentions, hesitations, speech errors, we can parse 
our own speech and become aware of a less felicitous expression, a speech error 
or other problems of delivery. Here the mediating processing component is our 
own language comprehension system. In case of serious trouble, the speaker may 
decide to stop and make a self-repair. This is called self-monitoring. And that 
is another property of any complex skill.
In the following, we will make a tour through this complex system and I will 
present selected examples of our research and theory on various of these 
processing components. But before going into that, I should make a few short 
remarks on how these components cooperate in the generation of fluent speech.
A first and important property of the system is what Kempen and Hoenkamp 
(1987) have called incrementality. The high-speed performance of the system 
requires parallel processing, but it is of a special kind. Usually we do not plan 
the full message before we start speaking. The availability of a first partial notion 
to be expressed suffices to begin grammatical encoding; there is immediate 
activation of appropriate words and a beginning of sentence construction. And 
as soon as there is a sentence initial word, phonological encoding is initiated. 
Also, we need only one or a few syllables and overt articulation can begin. Self­
monitoring can begin as soon as any stretch of internal speech has become 
available. This roofing tile style of parallel processing is called “incremental 
processing”.
Parallel processing is only possible because of the automaticity of the various 
processing components. That is a second major property of the system. We 
spend most of our attention on what to say, the topic of discourse, our 
communicative intention. But how we say it largely takes care of itself.
And, finally, the system has a high degree of modularity . The various 
processing components do their own work largely independent of what the 
other components are doing at the same time. There is surprisingly little 
interaction or feedback in the system, in spite of repeated claims to the 
contrary— especially in the connectionist literature. We have spent major efforts 
on testing such claims experimentally and time and again the result has been 
negative (see the section on Lexical Access below). And this quite limited 
interactiveness makes good functional sense. The processing components have 
to perform wildly different tasks. If they were to affect one another during 
processing, the system would become highly error-prone. But it is not. Speech 
errors are exceedingly rare events. Modularity is nature’s protection against 
processing failure.
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CONCEPTUAL PREPARATION
Let us turn now to the first, strategic component. How do we conceive what we 
want to express? This is something Noam Chomsky would call a mystery, 
something that will not be amenable to research during our life-time. But others, 
such as Daniel Dennett (1991), are less pessimistic. One fascinating idea I owe 
to him is that there may be spontaneous activity in the formulator. Words and 
phrases may spontaneously present themselves to us as internal speech, providing 
us with tatters of notions that we may take up for expression in the ongoing 
conversation. I will, however, refrain from going into these intriguing matters, 
and concentrate on one or two more tangible issues.
Given some sort of communicative intention, the speaker will go through two 
procedures, which Brian Butterworth (1980) usefully called macroplanning and 
microplanning. Macroplanning is selecting the information whose expression 
will serve the purpose of making one’s intention recognisable by the interlocutor. 
It also involves ordering that information in some effective way for the listener. 
Microplanning involves casting each bit of information in propositional form, 
and providing it with perspective. I will now present an example of each of these 
planning processes.
One important aspect of macroplanning is what I called linearisation (Levelt, 
1981), the ordering of information for expression. Speech is a linear medium; we 
can say only one thing at a time. But we often express complex, multidimensional 
information. In those cases, we have to decide what to say first, what to say next, 
etc. We are not very good at that. Try to explain the game of chess and you drown 
in the trouble of linearisation. Solving the linearisation problem means finding a 
path through the complex information structure to be expressed. How speakers 
do this we studied by means of patterns such as those in Fig. 5.2.
We asked our subjects to describe the patterns, starting at the arrow, in such 
a way that a listener should be able to draw them from the tape-recorded 
description. What we found is that speakers follow three principles in linearising 
such networks. The first is a principle of connectivity:
Principle of connectivity: Wherever possible, choose as the next node to be
described one that has a direct connection to the current node.
Without exception, subjects go from dot to dot, following the connectivities 
in the pattern; in pattern (a) they will go from green to blue to orange to yellow 
to pink, never from green to yellow, skipping blue and orange. But connectivity 
has its limits. The stumbling block is choice nodes. In describing pattern (b), 
subjects again start out in a connected fashion. They may, for instance, go from 
blue to black to orange to grey and then to red. But all nodes they pass between 
blue and red are choice nodes to which they must return in order to complete the 
pattern’s description. How do they do this? Here they follow the stack principle:
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FIG. 5.2 Patterns used to study speakers’ linearisation strategies.
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Stack principle: Return to the last choice node in the waiting line.
The principle says that one should always return to the last choice node one passed. 
One should make a memory stack of the choice nodes passed, and return to the 
top node on the stack. And that is indeed what subjects do. From red they return 
to grey and mention the connection to pink; they then return to orange and 
describe the whole structure above it. They then return to the last choice node 
on the stack, black, and describe the left side of the pattern.
The third principle tells us which branch to take first from a choice node. Do 
you go left first, or right, or straight?
Minimal load principle: Order alternative continuations in such a way that the
resulting memory load for return addresses is minimal.
The principle says “take the least memory loading branch first”. From the green 
choice node in pattern (c), for instance, it is the branch to the right; contrary to 
the branch to the left, it does not contain any further choice nodes.
These three principles could be implemented in an augmented transition 
network with a push-down memory (Levelt, 1981). That model adequately 
describes what speakers do in linearising such patterns. We found that these 
principles also hold for quite different information structures. And that should 
not surprise us, as they are based on quite general principles of memory 
management.
Turning now to microplanning, it can be demonstrated from the same kind of 
examples. Microplanning involves the propositionalisation of information. Take 
the sub-pattern of the orange (O) and yellow (Y) nodes in pattern (a). Dependent 
on their direction of linearisations, speakers will say something like “above O 
is Y”, or “below Y is O”. One object (the theme) is located with respect to the 
other object (the referent). In doing this, the speaker tacitly takes perspective. 
When starting at the green node, two-thirds of the speakers indeed locate yellow 
above orange. They tell you how their gaze moves over the pattern, namely 
upward from the yellow node. But some speakers take a different type of 
perspective. From green they go “straight” to blue, then “left” to orange and 
“right” to yellow, as if walking or driving a car through the pattern. They make 
a body tour, not a gaze tour. The same visual direction, therefore, can be 
propositionalised in different ways (involving the concept ABOVE or the concept 
RIGHT OF), dependent on the tacit perspective chosen. Listeners are 
demonstrably confused when a speaker takes a body tour perspective instead of 
the more common gaze tour perspective.
The example shows that the alignment of perspective is not a trivial matter. 
It is, moreover, a pervasive problem in conversation, not limited to spatial 
discourse. When we talk, we always choose a topic and a perspective on that 
topic. And in some way interlocutors must manage to align their perspectives.
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I will now leave this intriguing issue and turn to the next component, which is 
the linguistic heart of the system.
FORMULATING 
Overview
Once the speaker has a message, or an initial part of it available, formulating 
begins, and it involves two phases, grammatical encoding and phonological 
encoding. A first step in grammatical encoding is the retrieval of appropriate 
words for the concepts to be expressed. This is a fascinating process. In normal 
fluent speech, we retrieve words at a rate of two or three per second. At this rate 
we hit the appropriate words, sure as a gun, in a huge lexicon containing several 
tens of thousands of items. The occasional errors of selection, such as
Don’t bum your toes (intended: fingers)
show that the lexicon has a semantic organisation; misselections often involve 
semantically related items. In addition, the words that we retrieve, or lemmas as 
the technical term goes, each have their own syntactic properties. They are 
nouns, verbs (transitive or intransitive) or other categories, each requiring its 
own specific syntactic environment. Grammatical encoding is somewhat like 
solving a set of simultaneous equations. The syntactic requirements of all words 
retrieved have to be simultaneously realised (the technical term here is 
unification). The occasional syntactic misordering, such as
Seymour sliced the knife with a salami
shows that a word’s syntactic requirements are almost always met. Nouns only 
exchange with nouns, verbs only with verbs, etc. Though syntactic planning is 
an essential part of grammatical encoding, I will not discuss it here (but see Levelt, 
1989). I will rather concentrate on lexical selection, to which I will presently 
turn (after having introduced phonological encoding).
The second phase in formulating is phonological encoding. For each selected 
lemma, the speaker retrieves a phonological code, a sound form specified in the 
lexicon. It is also called a lexeme. And this is used to build up a phonetic program 
for the words and for the utterance as a whole. The occasional phonological speech 
error at this level, such as
With this wing I thee red
shows that there are no phonetic whole word templates. Rather, a word’s 
phonological units— roughly phonemes— are retrieved one by one.
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The two-phase process of selecting a lemma and computing its phonetic shape 
is called lexical access. In recent years, we have been working on a model of 
lexical access, the outlines of which I would like now to present.
Lexical Access
The model is a network through which activation spreads. It is not a connectionist 
model, but rather a model in the tradition of Collins, Quillian and Loftus, with 
labelled nodes and arcs and various conditions on the gating of information. 
Figure 5.3 is a small fragment of the network.
visual form
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FIG. 5 .3  Fragment of  lexical network (from Bock & Levelt, 1994). Reproduced by permission.
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There are three levels of strata to be distinguished. The top, conceptual level 
contains concept nodes. A concept’s semantic properties are represented by its 
network of labelled connections to other concepts. For instance, a sheep is a 
domestic animal, has wool as growth, and produces milk. Conceptual nodes can 
be activated by various means. The sheep node can, for instance, be activated 
by visual information, such as a visual image of a sheep. Some concepts, such 
as the one for SHEEP are lexical concepts; they have a direct link to a node on 
the second level.
This second level is the lemma level. Lemma nodes have syntactic properties. 
Sheep is of the category nouns and (in French) mouton is of male gender. Goat 
is also a noun lemma. In French (chèvre) it has female gender. A lemma node 
can be activated by spreading activation from the conceptual level, but also by 
acoustic or visual input: listening to the word or reading the word.
The third level is the lexeme level; here nodes represent a word’s sound form. 
In particular, they spread their information to a word’s constituent phonemes. 
A lexeme node can be activated by an active lemma, but also directly by the 
word’s written or spoken name.
The model is different from previous network models in at least one major 
respect. A word is now represented by three nodes, not a single one: a lexical 
concept node, a syntactic lemma node and a lexeme or sound form node. The 
syntactic lemma node has always been missing in other models.
Let us first consider lemma selection. As mentioned above, occasional 
selection errors tend to be of a semantic type. We may happen to say goat instead 
of sheep. In the model this is due to activation spreading within the conceptual 
level. As a consequence, the lemma for goat will receive some activation when 
SHEEP is the active concept. But normally, the lemma for sheep will get most 
activation. Ardi Roelofs (1992) proposed that the probability that a particular 
lemma will be selected during a given small time interval is the Luce ratio, i.e. 
the lemma’s activation divided by the total activation of all other active lemmas. 
Because selection is probabilistic, there is a minimal chance of error. And 
because activation spreads over semantic links, misselections tend to be 
semantically related to the target.
However, Roelofs didn't use errors as evidence for his model, but reaction 
times. The typical experiment is a picture-naming experiment. The subject names 
a picture, say one of a sheep, and the naming latency is measured. The task is, 
however, complicated by presenting the subjects with an acoustic or visual word 
that they are to ignore, the so-called “distractor stimulus”. So, for instance, when 
they are naming the picture of a sheep, they see or hear the word goat at some 
moment before or after the picture is presented, that is, at different stimulus onset 
asynchronies or SOAs. Typically, this affects the naming latency.
Figure 5.4 presents the classical results of Glaser and Diingelhoff (1984). It 
shows the inhibition that a semantically related interference word causes at 
different SOAs. It also shows how Roelofs’ model fits the data. You get inhibition
PICTURE NAMING INTERFERENCE
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FIG. 5 .4  Semantic interference results from Glaser and Diingelhoff (1984) and model predictions 
by Roelofs (1992).
because the interference word, say goat, is itself in the response set. It activates 
a response alternative, and hence decreases the Luce ratio for the target word,
i.e. sheep. But R oelofs  model also makes the non-trivial prediction that you 
should get facilitation if the distractor word is not in the response set and when 
it precedes the picture. And that is what was found (Roelofs, 1992).
We further found that lemma activation strictly precedes lexeme activation. 
Using the same picture-naming plus interference technique, Schriefers, Meyer 
and Levelt (1990) compared the effects of semantic and phonological distractors. 
So, if the picture depicts a sheep, we could give goat as a spoken distractor word. 
This affects lemma selection. Or we could give sheet, and this will affect 
phonological encoding, the activation of the speech sounds. As a baseline, we 
also used an unrelated stimulus, such as house. What we found is that a semantic 
distractor affects naming latency when the distractor word begins 150 ms before 
the picture; it interferes with lemma selection. But at that SOA, a phonological 
distractor is without effect. At a SOA of 0 ms, the distractors switch roles. There 
is no semantic interference any more, but there is a significant (and facilitatory) 
effect of the phonological prime.
The conclusion that lemma activation and selection strictly precede lexeme 
activation was further confirmed by Levelt et al. (1992). This paper showed that 
an active lemma does not send any activation to its lexeme. Only when a lemma
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is selected can the activation pass through to the lexeme stratum. This contradicts 
all published connectionist and cascading models. They all predict that activation 
will spread all the way down through a network. We found a strict separation 
between the stages of lemma selection and phonological encoding. Only the one 
selected lemma will become phonologically encoded. Also, we found that there 
is no feedback from the lexemes to the lemmas, again contrary to existing 
connectionist models.
Let me mention one further interesting property of this model. It has long been 
known that there is a word frequency effect in picture naming. It takes longer to 
initiate an infrequent name than to initiate a frequent name. We have now asked 
ourselves whether the frequency effect is due to accessing the lemma or to 
accessing the lexeme. If the model is correct, you can measure pure lemma access 
by means of a gender decision task, because the gender nodes are lemma level 
nodes (see Fig. 5.3). Dutch has ¿te-words and het-words, and these genders are 
properties of lemmas according to the model. Jorg Jescheniak and I presented 
pictures to subjects, asking them not to say anything, but to push one of two gender 
buttons (a de and a het button). We measured the gender decision reaction times. 
We took care that half of the critical pictures had high-frequency names, and that 
the other half had low-frequency names. The same pictures were used in a straight 
naming task, where we measured naming latencies. After some training with the 
pictures and tasks, subjects produced the usual frequency effect in the naming 
task, but no frequency effect in the gender decision task. This shows that the 
frequency effect is not due to accessing the word’s lemma, but to accessing its 
lexeme or phonological code. And indeed, a low-frequency homophone like bank 
(riverside) behaves like its high-frequency twin bank (financial institution) in terms 
of naming latency; that is because they share the same lexeme. It is, in short, the 
lexeme thresholds that are frequency dependent, not the lemma thresholds.
So much for lexical access. Let us now assume that we have retrieved the word’s 
phonological form. How then is a phonetic program constructed? Here the central 
process is syllabification.
Syllabification
When lexemes are activated, their sound units, usually phonemes, are spelled 
out one after another from beginning to end (see Levelt, 1992b, for discussion 
and references). And this is the beginning of syllabification. Syllabification is 
the chunking of successive speech sounds into pronounceable syllables. 
Syllabification ignores word boundaries. When you say Peter gave him it, then 
the three words gave , him and it, will cluster together, creating one so-called 
“phonological word”. The phonological word is the domain of syllabification. 
Following the rules of the language, we get ga-vi-mit here, which violates all 
lexical word boundaries. This incremental syllable production follows both 
universal and language-specific rules (see Levelt, 1992b).
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The main unanswered question now is: How does the speaker get from such 
composed syllables to detailed articulatory motor programs? Our hypothesis is 
that speakers have access to a mental syllabary (see Fig. 5.1). For each syllable 
the syllabary has an almost fully specified articulatory program— a set of 
articulatory gestures that will create the intended syllable.
How can we know that we have such a syllable store in our mind? Linda 
Wheeldon and I (in prep.) argued as follows: There is a word frequency effect, 
and— as I showed above— we know that it stems from accessing our store of 
lexemes or word sound forms. If we have an independent store of syllables, there 
might very well be a syllable frequency effect as well. And if these two stores 
are independent, then word frequency and syllable frequency should have purely 
additive effects in a naming task.
We tested this hypothesis in a naming task where four types of bisyllabic words 
were used. There were low-frequency words with low-frequency syllables (like 
lantern), low-frequency words with high-frequency syllables (like litter), high- 
frequency words with low-frequency syllables (like language) and high- 
frequency words with high-frequency syllables (like lady). The naming latencies 
for these four classes of items indeed showed the predicted additive relation: 
We found both a word frequency and a syllable frequency effect, and the effects 
were independent of one another. It is, to my knowledge, the first experimental 
result to testify to the existence of an independent syllabary in the speaker’s mind, 
but the theory needs further corroboration.
Returning now to my “blueprint” of the speaker (Fig. 5.1), I have discussed 
some aspects of grammatical and phonological encoding, but by no means all 
aspects. In particular, I skipped the absolutely essential mechanisms of syntactic 
and prosodic planning. I will also pass the Articulator’s operation, the way in 
which syllable programs are executed by laryngeal and supralaryngeal 
musculature (but see Levelt, 1989), and finally turn to the speaker’s mechanisms 
of self-monitoring and self-repair.
SELF-MONITORING
Speakers listen to their own internal and overt speech. When they notice trouble 
of some kind, they may decide to interrupt themselves and make a repair, as in 
the following example:
We can go straight to the ye- to the orange node
In general, a speaker stops immediately upon detecting trouble, but not every 
bit of trouble is detected. Remember that speakers spend most of their attention 
on planning what to say. Monitoring requires attention. One should, therefore, 
predict that the detection of trouble is best for words that appear towards the end 
of phrases. Those are the places where the planning of an idea is just over and
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the speaker’s attention can be momentarily free. And this is what I found in an 
analysis of spontaneous self-repairs (Levelt, 1983).
Although speakers can interrupt themselves at any place, interrupting any 
linguistic constituent, like in the middle of the word (see the above example), 
the way they restart after self-interruption is surprisingly systematic. Restarting 
is governed by the language’s rules of coordination. Consider these two repairs:
1. Is the nurse— er— the doctor interviewing patients?
2. Is the doctor seeing— er— the doctor interviewing patients?
The first repair above we experience as well-formed, as a possible repair. The 
second repair, however, is odd or ill-formed. And, in fact, the latter kind of repair 
is quite rare in our data. But notice that the repair proper, i.e. the part after self­
interruption, is the same in the two cases. Hence, the acceptability of a repair 
depends on something else than on the way the speaker restarts. It rather depends 
on the repair’s relation to the interrupted stretch of speech, which is different in 
the two cases. How?
The first, well-formed repair (1) corresponds to an equally well-formed 
coordination (3). The second, ill-formed repair (2), however, corresponds to a 
coordination that we experience as ill-formed (4):
3. Is the nurse or the doctor interviewing patients?
4. Is the doctor seeing patients or the doctor interviewing patients?
When we repair, we keep the interrupted syntax in abeyance, and graft the repair 
onto it in a linguistically principled manner, just as we do in coordination.
There are many other fascinating aspects of self-monitoring that I must leave 
undiscussed; the reader is referred to Levelt (1989).
CONCLUSION
We have made a tour through the main processing components involved in 
speaking. But it could not do justice to all the complexities of the skill at hand. 
What I call the “blueprint” of the speaker (Fig. 5.1) is, on the one hand, a frame 
of reference for summarising two or three decades of research in speaking by 
several colleagues and by my own Institute. But, on the other hand, it is also a 
theoretical framework that inspires a research programme. The reader can find 
more on both in Levelt (1989, 1992a).
Much more important, though, than the details of the architecture proposed 
should be the conclusion that the most complex and most ignored human 
cognitive-motor skill is not beyond scientific analysis, whether experimentally 
or theoretically. We can expect major progress here in the near future.
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